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ABSTRACT: Since 9/11, Western democracies are increasingly targeted by what 
has been termed Islamic-inspired Home-grown terrorism (IIHGT). This paper 
investigates what we really know about this more recent phenomenon and 
reveals several interesting, potentially troubling, findings. Canadian, American 
and Australian cases demonstrate that IIHGT actually takes many different 
forms, depending on endgame, size, organization, and scale and sophistication. 
It also identifies that despite consistent changes and shifts in form, IIHGT does 
not follow a clearly identifiable or linear trajectory, making the identification of 
trends moving forward very difficult. The paper concludes that while IIHGT 
generally seems to be devolving, this might be portrayed instead as an evolu-
tion because the transformation, more likely inadvertent than intentional, will 
make these types of plots more difficult to identify, monitor and prevent, thus 
improving the likelihood they will become increasingly successful in the future.
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Islamic-Inspired Home-Grown 
Terrorism (IIHGT): What We Know 
and What It Means Moving Forward
Michael G. Zekulin, PhD
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary
After September 11, 2001, governments, policymakers and academics became increasingly interested in al-Qaida and Islamic-inspired international terrorism. However, almost immediately, a different 
type of Islamic-inspired terrorist threat began to simmer beneath the surface: 
homegrown terrorism. The first such incident to receive attention was that of 
Jose Padilla, an American born Muslim convert who planned to detonate a 
dirty bomb in downtown Chicago. While this development raised eyebrows, 
very few anticipated that it would become the threat it has today. In the years 
since Islamic-inspired Homegrown Terrorism (IIHGT) first emerged, it has 
become an increasingly common but understudied and poorly explained 
phenomenon. Many questions remain about IIHGT, none more important 
than what it actually looks like and how it should defined. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of these matters through 
the compilation and analysis of Canadian IIHGT cases, something absent 
from the literature, unlike other Western democratic countries.1 In order to 
tie this work to the wider literature, the findings from Canada are briefly 
compared to those from Australia and the United States. This comparison 
aims to examine whether Canada’s experience with IIHGT is like that of 
other states and whether it demonstrates patterns or trends which illuminate 
this broader phenomenon. It also investigates whether any obvious progres-
sion or trajectory can be identified indicating what we might expect from 
IIHGT moving forward. 
The comparison with Australia is appropriate due to factors such as its 
comparable place in the world as a secondary power, and like Canada, its 
lesser strategic or symbolic importance. Both have pursued a limited but 
supportive role in the Global War on Terror and both have been named by 
al-Qaida as a target.2 Like Canada, Australia has, to date, experienced sev-
eral plots without a successful attack. Comparison with the United States is 
logical, due to its proximity to Canada and the shared security environment. 
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The U.S. also represents the epicenter or primary target for Islamist extrem-
ists and has experienced many more incidents. 
 The paper begins with a discussion of IIHGT. To date, the literature pro-
vides a generic and broad description of the phenomenon; as a result, IIHGT 
is defined in many different forms. Following an assessment of Australia 
and the U.S., the three states’ experiences with IIHGT are briefly compared. 
The paper concludes that, despite some clear similarities among the IIHGT 
incidents in the three states, no observable pattern or trend exists, and in this 
way IIHGT is much like international Islamic-inspired terrorism. Further, be-
neath the superficial similarities of each state’s IIHGT incidents, unique state-
to-state characteristics also appear. Another interesting observation which 
emerges from an examination of the cases in the U.S., and, to a lesser degree, 
Canada, reveals that those plotting the attacks are smaller groups, pursuing 
smaller plots with varying degrees of ambition and sophistication. Although 
this devolution appears inadvertent, without indication of a purposeful shift 
or strategy, it could nonetheless be viewed as a form of evolution, and, in any 
case, is alarming. Terrorism, including IIHGT, is clandestine by nature. Those 
who pursue it attempt to avoid detection in order to successfully conduct 
their attack. The larger the group and the more ambitious and sophisticated 
the attack, the greater the likelihood that a group will be identified before its 
preparations have been completed. As groups become smaller and their plots 
less ambitious and sophisticated, they become more difficult to detect and 
disrupt. This phenomenon poses a myriad of challenges for those working 
to prevent such attacks. This devolution also suggests the likelihood of an 
increase in successful IIHGT attacks in the future. The paper concludes with 
some suggestions about refining our understanding of IIHGT and how this 
might provide better results and research approaches. 
Defining IIHGT and the Literature
IIHGT, also known as homegrown jihadist terrorism, exacerbates an existing 
problem in the field of terrorism studies. Defining terrorism remains a conten-
tious issue, and efforts to include a definition for IIHGT muddies the waters 
even further. The number of definitions of IIHGT in the literature continues 
to grow with the increasing number of incidents. Included below are several 
definitions from many individuals and agencies. A common thread links the 
different definitions, but there has been a growing divergence around the 
edges and a slow expansion of the term. 
The Department of Homeland Security defines a homegrown violent 
extremist as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated pri-
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marily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is 
preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including 
providing support for terrorism) in furtherance of political or social object-
ives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently 
of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.”3 For scholars such as Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, “home-grown” individuals are those 
who “either spent a significant portion of their formative years in the West, 
or else their radicalization bears a significant connection to the West.”4 For 
Tomas Precht, home-grown terrorism involves “acts of violence against tar-
gets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in which the terrorists 
themselves have been born or raised.”5 Jerome Bjelopera argues that “home-
grown is a term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within 
the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents 
or visitors largely radicalized within the United States.”6 While this clearly 
focuses on an American definition, any nationality can be inserted into this 
equation and it applies.
Governments also struggle to define this phenomenon. The European 
Union has yet to create a definition for IIHGT, although its annual terrorism 
reports from 2009 through 2013 show gradual movement in this direction. 
Earlier reports simply identified a general threat posed by Islamist terror-
ism, defined as “terrorism perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks 
or organizations which evoke a certain interpretation of Islam to justify 
their action.”7 Later ones acknowledge a distinction between international 
Islamist terrorism and terrorist groups, and “something else”, by suggesting 
that the threat was “increasingly likely to originate from self-radicalized 
individuals who may not necessarily be linked to al-Qaida senior leader-
ship.”8 The 2012 report is the first to use language indicating IIHGT.9 In 2013, 
it mentions the term “homegrown terrorist groups” for the first time, but 
does not define it.10 
The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) employs the term 
home-grown extremism, defined as “the indoctrination and radicalization of 
individuals into the ideology espoused and propagated by al-Qaida.”11 CSIS 
further acknowledges that one of the main catalysts is “the adoption of sig-
nificant grievances against Western governments, their societies and way of 
life, as well as the conviction that the Muslim world is under attack and needs 
defending through the use of violence.”12 This is not really a definition of 
IIHGT per se, instead focusing on indoctrination by al-Qaida rather than on 
actual outcomes. Similarly, Australia has yet to define IIGHT, instead relying 
on its definition of terrorism with the note that “a number of Australians are 
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known to subscribe to violent jihadist messages,” while some are radicalized 
enough to be willing to advance their political aims through violence.13 
This exercise highlights the first major pitfall facing those who study 
IIHGT. Many of the incidents the literature considers to be homegrown do not 
fit neatly into our traditional framework of either domestic or international 
terrorism. This problem complicates our efforts to understand IIHGT, and 
how it should be studied. Consider some definitions for domestic terrorism. 
In a recent report, Jerome Bjelopera defines domestic terrorists in the United 
States as “people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw in-
spiration from US based extremist ideologies and movements.”14 This follows 
closely the FBI’s basic definition of domestic terrorism, which at its simplest is 
“Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies.”15 
Wilkinson suggests that domestic, or what he termed “internal” terrorism, 
was characterized as terrorist attacks occurring within one state or province, 
used specifically to differentiate it from international terrorism.16 Conversely, 
terrorism is considered to be international when: more than one country is 
involved in the attack, if the nationality of the perpetrator differs from that of 
the victims; if the terrorists are operating outside their national boundaries, 
or if terrorists of different nationalities act together.17 Until approximately 
2005, the term homegrown terrorism in the U.S. was reserved for domestic 
organizations, including anti-government militias, white supremacists and 
eco-terrorists purposefully so to distinguish them from jihadist terrorist 
networks, which were perceived to be foreign.18 IIHGT on the other hand 
implies that individuals of a country carry out attacks in that country with an 
international agenda. In other variations, individuals cross borders, or assist 
foreign groups across borders.
These definitions of IIHGT predominantly focus on the geographical 
location of the individual when they were radicalized, with less attention to 
what follows from this radicalization. For example, according to this litera-
ture a terrorist act is homegrown if: 
• an individual or group plots to attack within the country they 
were radicalized; 
• an individual provides logistical, financial or propaganda sup-
port to a terrorist group operating outside his own country; 
• a previously radicalized individual travels abroad to join a 
terrorist group and assist in planning attacks against foreign 
interests or; 
• an individual travels abroad to join a group and participate in 
jihad. 
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While some who study radicalization may be interested solely in the location 
where the radicalization occurred, students of terrorism might additionally 
wish to consider other aspects of the attacks or actions, including location, 
target, nationality of victims and other indicators. 
Compounding the definitional issues, as cases from the Canadian ex-
perience show, the reality is that this phenomenon takes many forms. IIHGT 
in Canada has been perpetrated by large groups, smaller groups and lone 
individuals. There have been ambitious and large plots designed to kill hun-
dreds of people, and smaller scale efforts designed to emphasize chaos and 
disorder. They demonstrate either sophistication or amateurism, efforts to 
join with like-minded individuals or complete autonomy. They also show 
the radicalization of a wide range of individuals, from those raised Muslim 
to individuals who have converted from other religions. 
The scale and sophistication of incidents are also important as individ-
uals raised in Western democratic societies do not readily have access to 
certain skill sets prevalent where Islamic terrorism is more frequent. Terms 
such as scale or sophistication are arbitrary and subjective and are not dis-
cussed in the literature in any meaningful way. Without agreement on what 
constitutes a small or large scale attack, it has been characterized as a sliding 
scale based on an estimate of the potential scale and ambitious nature of the 
plot as well as and the number of individuals affected. An attack to topple 
a large building, targeting mass transit or the deployment of larger or mul-
tiple explosive devices would fall higher on such a scale. The literature does 
equate group size to potential for lethality, in part because a larger group is 
thought to have the ability to secure greater resources.19
Whether it is relevant to examine the sophistication or complexity of 
an attack and how one might do so is more controversial. This measure 
remains significantly underdeveloped in the literature. Traditionally, so-
phistication has been linked to —anything that increases the success or 
efficiency of the attack, such as knowledge, expertise or training.20 More 
recently, this idea has included the role of the Internet, focusing on the 
dissemination of propaganda and information21 and means to transfer 
tactical expertise or training individuals.22 The most recent effort to under-
stand complexity is Teun van Dongen’s framework, the Terrorist Attack 
Complexity Index.23 This framework, examines indicators such as the pres-
ence of training or expertise and type of weapon used. This paper will in-
corporate a similar idea. A simple measure of sophistication distinguishes 
between modes of carrying out the plot. For example, firearms, grenades, 
and simple or prefabricated explosives are considered less sophisticated 
islamic-inspired home-grown terrorism
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devices or delivery systems and more amateurish than larger explosives, 
involving the combining of a variety of chemicals, car bombs, suicide 
vests, etc. A matrix for each state’s IIHGT plots can be found in the appen-
dix. They have been categorized based on whether they were large scale 
or small scale and their degree of sophistication. As this exercise is very 
subjective, it is possible that some of the incidents, especially those in the 
United States, might not fit neatly into one category. A plot may be a low 
end large scale attack but similarly it might be a high end low scale attack 
yet, for the sake of analysis, it must be placed in one of the categories. It is 
entirely possible that some scholars may disagree with the categorization 
of some attacks within the matrix.
This paper will work with a broad understanding of IIHGT raised in the 
literature, considering it as: “individuals who are born and raised or have 
spent considerable time living in a Western democratic states who attack, 
or plan to attack that state; or provide support to other individuals; or travel 
abroad to fight with another terrorist group where the motivation is not a 
domestic one but rather part of the global jihadist ideology.” 
Canadian IIHGT Cases since 9/11
The following section outlines IIHGT incidents in Canada since 9/11 made 
public by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. As a caveat, these 
cases should be taken as accurate up to August 2013. Information on these 
incidents was obtained from public sources and it is, therefore, possible that 
some may be incomplete, especially if information has been purposefully 
withheld from the public record. Information on these incidents may take 
years to be released as those arrested are brought to trial. Several details sur-
rounding the 2006 “Toronto 18” plots did not emerge until the final court case 
concluded nearly five years later. 
Project Awaken: Mohammad Momin Khawaja
Mohammad Momin Khawaja was one of the first Canadian terrorists to 
emerge in the post 9/11 era, and was the first to be sentenced using anti-terror 
legislation passed in 2001.24 Khawaja, although born in Ottawa, spent con-
siderable time during his youth in various Middle Eastern states including 
Libya, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the mid-1990s, he returned to Ottawa 
where he completed his education as a computer programmer. He was ar-
rested there on March 29th 2004, and charged with financing and facilitating 
terrorism in connection with the activities of several British men in London 
between November 2003 and March 2004.25 
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The case against Khawaja, outlined in an Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice Brief,26 reveals that he had visited a terrorist training camp in Pakistan 
in July 2003, where he met several like-minded British Muslims. His activities 
were brought to the attention of Canadian security agencies by British intelli-
gence who had uncovered a plot to attack British targets. Surveillance during 
Operation Crevice revealed that he was involved in a plot to set off bombs at a 
London nightclub, a construction firm, and gas, water and power utilities.27 
Correspondence between Khawaja and the British men also revealed that 
he had provided travel assistance to various individuals en route to terrorist 
camps in Afghanistan. When the RCMP searched his residence, they found 
email links between him and his British co-conspirators, ten thousand dollars 
in cash, computer hard drives, terrorist literature and invoices for electronics 
used to build a remote detonator. Khawaja had managed to build a func-
tioning prototype for a highly sophisticated remote detonator, dubbed the 
“hifidigimonster,” completely from scratch, and authorities believe he was 
contracted to develop an additional thirty detonators.28 Initially sentenced 
to ten and a half years in prison, the Ontario Court of Appeal increased 
Khawaja’s term to life in 2010.29
Project Osage: The “Toronto 18” Groups
The highest profile terrorist threat to Canada to date emerged in the summer 
of 2006 when authorities revealed that they had infiltrated and disrupted an 
imminent and large-scale domestic terrorist plot. Eighteen individuals were 
arrested and accused of planning a concerted bombing campaign against 
targets including the Toronto Stock Exchange, Toronto headquarters of 
CSIS, CFB Trenton and the Parliament buildings to commemorate the fifth 
anniversary of the September 11 attacks.30 However, the descriptive mon-
iker “Toronto 18” may be a misrepresentation as the 18 arrested actually 
represented two separate groups. At one point a group of individuals led by 
Fahim Ahmad and his lieutenant, Zakaria Amara, discussed the commission 
of a terrorist attack. However, the two had a falling out which led to Amara 
leaving the group, recruiting two additional members and planning his own 
terrorist attack. It was the Amara group that acquired three metric tonnes of 
ammonium nitrate, enough to make several large and destructive bombs.31 
Conversely the Ahmad group continued to discuss unspecified plots and 
conduct training camps in Toronto area parks with no imminent plot under 
consideration.32 
In total, fourteen adults and four youths were charged. While informa-
tion on the youths remains unavailable, of the fourteen adults, four were 
islamic-inspired home-grown terrorism
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Canadians, and ten were immigrants to Canada. All of the accused had 
resided in Canada for at least 13 years.33 The Toronto 18 incidents took close 
to five years to resolve and the last individual was tried in late 2010. In the 
end, two individuals received life sentences, three received less than seven 
years, and the rest were credited with time served and released or had their 
charges stayed or dismissed.
Project Summum: Said Namouh
The case of Said Namouh (34) who was arrested by the RCMP in 2007, received 
very little media attention. Born in Morocco, Namouh became a permanent 
Canadian resident in 2002. It was alleged that he became involved with the 
Global Islamic Media Front, a group linked to al-Qaida and was responsible 
for uploading and maintaining propaganda videos, and literature as well 
tools for recruitment.34 He was also linked to bomb plots against targets in 
Germany and Austria in retribution for their involvement in Afghanistan,35 
and was sentenced to life in prison. He will be eligible for parole in 2017.
Tahawwur Rana
Tahawwur Rana (52) moved to Canada from Pakistan in 1997 and received 
Canadian citizenship in 2001. A physician/businessman, Rana later moved 
to Chicago but retained a residence in Ottawa. In 2009, he was arrested along-
side U.S. citizen David Headley, also known as Daood Gialni (49), a childhood 
acquaintance from Pakistan and accused of providing material support to the 
Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-taiba. In 2013, Rana was found guilty of 
contributing resources towards a plot to bomb Jyllands-Postens in Denmark 
in retaliation for their publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and 
sentenced to 14 years in prison. He was, however, acquitted of any role in 
assisting the 2008 Mumbai hotel attack.36
Project Samosa: The “Ottawa 3”-- Misbahuddin Ahmed, Hiva Alizadeh and 
Khurram Sher
In August 2010, Misbahuddin Ahmed (26), Hiva Alizadeh (30), and Khurram 
Sher (28) were arrested in Ottawa and accused of planning a domestic terror-
ist attack. During a search of an Ottawa residence, police seized more than 
50 electronic circuit boards which were to be used to develop remote deton-
ators as well as terrorist literature, videos and manuals and plans, materials 
and a list of potential targets.37 The target list is alleged to have included the 
Parliament buildings and Montreal subway system. Of the three individuals 
charged, Sher was born and raised in Montreal, Ahmed was a Canadian 
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citizen raised in Canada but born in Pakistan and Alizadeh was born in Iraq 
but immigrated to Canada in 2000.38
Authorities alleged that Alizadeh had connections to international 
terrorist groups and that he attended training camps in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan where he was trained to construct electronic devices.39 This 
revelation led authorities to issue warrants for three non-Canadian citizens 
living abroad who have yet to be captured.40
Sayfildin Tahir Sharif 
In January 2011, Edmontonian Sayfildin Tahir Sharif (38), also known as Faruq 
Khalil Muhammad Isa, was arrested. An ethnic Kurd born in Iraq, he arrived 
in Canada as a refugee in 1993 and became a Canadian citizen in 1997.41 U.S. 
authorities monitored Sharif because they believed he was facilitating terror-
ism against American soldiers in Iraq. They alleged that Sharif supported “a 
multinational terrorist network that conducted multiple suicide bombings 
in Iraq and is responsible for the death of 5 American soldiers in Mosul.”42 
A U.S. District Court delivered a twenty-five page complaint to Canadian 
authorities asking for his extradition. U.S. authorities provided a detailed 
account of conversations and emails between Sharif and several people in 
Iraq documenting his anger at US forces and his fascination with martyr-
dom. They included details of his correspondence with several Tunisians in 
Iraq, linked to the suicide bombing which killed US soldiers in April 2009,43 
and another against an Iraqi police station in March 2009.44 As of July 2013, 
Canadian officials had agreed to extradite him to the United States where he 
faces life in prison.45
Algeria Gas Plant Attack: Ali Medlej and Xrstos Katsiroubas
In January 2013, the Al-Mulathameen brigade, also known as “Those Who 
Sign with Blood” attacked the Tigantouine Gas Plant in Amenas, Algeria. 
This group, an offshoot of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) led by 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, seized the plant for four days and held over 800 work-
ers hostage. Algerian Special Forces stormed the plant and two Canadians 
were identified among the eighty dead. These individuals were not foreign 
nationals working at the plant but were part of the militant group who had 
launched the terrorist attack.46 
Ali Medlej (24) and Xristos Katsiroubas (22) were both born and raised 
in Canada and grew up in London Ontario. Medlej was a practicing Muslim 
and Katsiroubas, initially a Greek Orthodox Christian converted to Islam 
sometime between 2004 and 2006. Following confirmation that Medlej and 
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Katsiroubas had been part of the attack, Canadian officials announced their 
interest in two additional individuals known to be traveling with them. 
Aaron Yoon (24) had traveled with Medlej and Katsiroubas to the region but 
had been arrested in Mauritania and sentenced to prison for having links 
to a terrorist group prior to the Gas Plant attack. Yoon, who converted to 
Islam sometime in 2008, maintains his innocence and asserts he traveled to 
Mauritania to study the Koran and lost contact with Medlej and Katsiroubas, 
only learning of their death at a later time. He claims that his prison sentence 
was based on a confession he gave while being tortured and has since been 
released and returned to Canada in July 2013.47 A fourth man, Ryan Enderi 
(19) was located living in Tripoli, Libya. While he acknowledged his friend-
ship with Medlej, Katsiroubas and Yoon, he maintains that he had not been 
in contact with them since the 2011 and denies any ties to terrorism.48 
Authorities pieced together a timeline that suggests that Medlej, 
Katsiroubas and Yoon traveled to Mauritania in summer 2011 and were 
detained by law enforcement. It is alleged that, when freed, Medlej and 
Katsiroubas attended a training camp in northern Mali in fall 2012 before 
going to work at the gas plant as “scouts,” prior to their participation in the 
attack months later. However, it is unknown who radicalized the men and 
who might have assisted them once they were in Northern Africa.49 
VIA Train Plot
On April 21st, 2013, Canadian officials announced the arrest of Chiheb 
Essigheir (30) a Tunisian national who had been in Canada since 2008 pursu-
ing doctoral studies, and Raed Jaser (35) a Palestinian-Canadian who had 
been in Canada since 1993, for plotting to bomb VIA trains in the Toronto-
New York corridor. Authorities suggested that the plot had links to al-Qaida 
elements in Iran.50 A third man, Ahmed Abassi (26), was later identified as 
having a role in the plot and had been arrested in the U.S. Little is known 
about the Tunisian national, Abassi, a graduate student in Canada since 2009 
who had recently relocated to the U.S.51 More information will no doubt be-
come available as this incident moves through the legal system.
Project Souvenir: John Stewart Nuttal and Amanda Korody
The most recent Islamic inspired terror plot in Canada came to light on July 
1st, 2013. John Stewart Nuttall (38) and Amanda Korody (28) were both ar-
rested by the RCMP for plotting to bomb the BC legislature in Victoria on 
Canada Day using pressure cooker bombs similar to those deployed by the 
bombers at the Boston Marathon on April 15th 2013. 52 Under surveillance 
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since February 2013, these Canadians are portrayed as former petty crim-
inals and drug users who had previously belonged to various anti-social 
ideologies before converting to Islam. The plot was described by authorities 
as “inspired by al-Qaida” although to date no further clarification has been 
provided.53 They are described as self-radicalized.
Canadians Fighting Abroad
Many Canadians also have left Canada to participate in jihads abroad. In 
the first few months of 2011, two separate instances were made public when 
arrest warrants were issued for two former Winnipeggers, Ferid Ahmed 
Imam (30), and Maiwand Yar (27), linked to a failed 2009 plot to blow up 
the New York City subway system. These two individuals have not been 
seen since 2007 when they left to fight in Afghanistan. Their whereabouts 
remain unknown today.54 Meanwhile, Mohamed Hersi (25) was arrested at 
Pearson International Airport in March 2011 on his way to join al-Shabaab, a 
Somali terrorist group linked to al-Qaida. Allegedly, he also was attempting 
to convince others to join the group as well.55 This incident led top Canadian 
security officials in conjunction with members of the Toronto Somali com-
munity to reveal that at least twenty other Toronto area youths have been 
recruited by the group as well.56 
Summary of Canadian Cases
This paper has identified ten cases in Canada over the past ten years which 
fall within the literature’s description of IIHGT. However, the inclusion of 
some of these cases could be challenged for several reasons. First, this paper 
considers the Toronto 18 incidents, as the original group fractured and 
created two separate groups, after which additional members joined the 
second group.57 Second, one cannot accurately determine every incident 
where young Canadians departed to join jihadist groups abroad. Many are 
not reported or, like the case of Aaron Yoon, families are unaware of their 
relatives real travel plans. Third, the case of Tahawwhur Rana is subject to 
interpretation. It is unclear whether he was radicalized in Pakistan before his 
arrival in Canada, or at a later date in Canada. Fourth, the RCMP alleges that 
the 2013 VIA train plot had direction from al-Qaida in Iran, which suggests 
that it could be considered to be an international incident. While a reason-
able argument can be made that perhaps Chiheb Essigheir, who was only 
in Canada for five years, arrived in Canada pre-radicalized, his alleged co-
conspirator Raed Jaser, though not a Canadian citizen, had lived in Canada 
for over twenty years, and was most likely radicalized here. Finally, this 
islamic-inspired home-grown terrorism
12
paper has not included the case of Hassan El Hajj Hassan, accused of playing 
a prominent role in the July 2012 Bulgarian bus bombing, because though he 
held Canadian citizenship, he has reportedly not been in Canada in any real 
capacity since 2000.58
The ten cases involve thirty-four individuals (including Aaron Yoon but 
excluding Essigheir and Abassi from the VIA Plot and Ryan Enderi from 
the Algerian Gas Plant attack). In terms of nationality, eleven were born in 
Canada, fourteen were born elsewhere but had obtained Canadian citizen-
ship, and four individuals did not have Canadian citizenship but had been 
in Canada for several years The citizenship of one individual, “Toronto 18” 
member Ibrahim Aboud could not be confirmed.
Table 1
Nationality of Individuals Involved in IIHGT (Canada)
Twenty-four individuals plotted to attack domestic targets within 
Canada. Six individuals joined or planned to join jihadist groups abroad.59 
Three individuals pursued logistical and support roles although Momin 
Khawaja, who provided detonators to a group abroad, might also fit within 
this category.
Looking at the incidents from an organizational perspective, the 
Scarborough faction of the Toronto 18 was a large group of at least twelve 
members. The Mississauga component had six members. The Ottawa 3 and 
the Canada Day 2 groups represent smaller units. Medlej, Katsiroubas and 
Yoon probably fall within this category as a cluster of three as well. Finally 




“Endgame” of IIHGT Incidents (Canada)
Table 3
Size of Group Plotting Attack (Canada)
While these individuals may have had some correspondence or connec-
tion to others, nothing suggests that this occurred within Canada. Finally, 
seven of the thirty-four individuals were non-Muslims who converted to 
Islam, including Zakaria Amara, Jahmaal James, Steven Chand, Xristos 
Katsiroubas, Aaron Yoon, John Stewart Nuttal and Amanda Korody. 
Looking specifically at the plots to attack Canadian targets, the 
Mississauga group of the Toronto 18, and the Ottawa 3 were large scale am-
bitious plots designed to kill and injure a large number of Canadians, and 
were relatively sophisticated, involving multiple large explosive devices and, 
remote detonations. The Scarborough component of the Toronto 18 is more 
difficult to categorize due to the constantly shifting plots and plans60 but 
will be classified as large and amateurish. The VIA train plot might also fall 
within this category although there is little information currently available 
about the number or types of explosives or whether it was one or multiple 
trains or compartments. The Canada Day plot was a smaller scale attack, 
lacking any real sophistication.
The Canadian experience shows an increase in non-Muslim conversions 
and individuals opting to travel abroad to join foreign groups. The plots also 
seem to be becoming smaller in scale, less ambitious and sophisticated, and 
the plotters smaller than the earlier groups of the Toronto 18. An analysis of 
the Canadian experience reveals that IIHGT has appeared in many forms, 




Scale and Sophistication of IIHGT Plots (Canada)
IIHGT in Australia and the US
The limited sample of Canadian cases makes it difficult to identify any 
meaningful patterns or trends. Thus, to understand IIHGT as a phenom-
enon and to contextualize the Canadian cases in a larger framework, and 
see whether any broader patterns or trends come to light, it is important to 
understand how IIHGT has unfolded in other Western democratic states. . 
This exercise is by no means exhaustive, rather it is intended to serve as a 
starting point for a larger project designed to integrate numerous reports 
across many states. This analysis will be less in-depth than the Canadian 
cases, and will focus on less subjective factors for which there is public 
information. The American case studies were compiled and analyzed by 
reputable authors and organizations using a similar methodology em-
ployed here. The authors were forthcoming about the limitations of their 
own work and recognized that some of their assessments were open to 
interpretation. In order to avoid methodological pitfalls, the analysis will 
focus on select areas including whether incidents can be categorized as 
supporting groups abroad, traveling overseas to fight with a foreign group 
or, intent to attack a domestic target within a particular state. Group size, 
the scale of their plans and their sophistication will also be examined. 
Additional factors such as the citizenship of perpetrators, the duration of 
time in the country and whether individuals were converts, will not be 
included in the American analysis due to the difficulties in obtaining ro-
bust and reliable information. I intend to research each of the U.S. cases 





Australian analysts, noting an increase in Islamic terrorism, recognize that, 
in 2004, a clear shift occurred towards IIHGT61. A chronological account of all 
Islamist terrorism in Australia created by Sam Mullins makes it possible to 
examine terrorism attacks to identify those meeting the literature’s descrip-
tion of IIHGT. The main differences between his efforts and this paper are that 
Mullins included all Islamic incidents in Australia and did not distinguish 
between international or domestic events, nor did he identify or categorize 
different endgames. Further, he focuses only on Australia, without making 
any comparisons to other countries’ experiences. Using open sources includ-
ing media accounts, court transcripts and government reports, each IIHGT 
incident was analyzed in detail. This resulted in the inclusion of cases where 
individuals, either born or resident in Australia for an extended period 
where radicalization is likely to have occurred, either plotted a domestic at-
tack in Australia, travelled to join groups abroad or providinged support for 
the global jihadist movement. 62 
There were six highly publicized incidents as well as an undetermined 
number of individuals suspected to have gone abroad to fight. The first in-
cident was that of duel Pakistani-Australian citizen Faheem Lodhi (34). In 
2003, he was arrested alongside a French national named Willie Brigitte for 
plotting a terrorist attack in Australia. Lodhi downloaded photos of military 
sites and blueprints of Australian electrical grids and made enquiries about 
purchasing multiple chemicals using a false company. Lodhi, who had ar-
rived in Australia in the late 1990s, had no previous relationship with Brigitte. 
They had only been introduced by a Pakistani intermediary prior to Brigitte’s 
arrival in Australia.63
In 2003, Joseph Thomas (30) an Australian born convert known famously 
as “Jihad Jack,” was arrested for providing material support to al-Qaida. The 
charges were later quashed but Thomas was placed on a very strict control 
order that monitored and prevented certain movement.64 In 2004, Australian 
officials arrested Belal Khazaad (37), a dual Lebanese-Australian who ob-
tained his Australian citizenship in 1986, charging him with inciting others 
to commit jihad and publishing and posting a “do-it-yourself” terrorist 
manual. He had previously been convicted in 2003 by a court in Beirut in 
absentia for his role in helping fund a bombing campaign in Lebanon.65
In 2005, officials disrupted two separate yet interconnected plots cul-
minating in the largest investigation in Australian history. Dubbed the 
Pendennis plot, a group of fifteen individuals were detained for planning 
several large-scale terrorist attacks against targets including the Melbourne 
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Cricket Grounds during the 2005 Australian Football League Grand Final 
and the Melbourne Crown Casino during Grand Prix weekend.66 At trial, 
only nine were convicted, including Abdul Nacer Benbrika (48), an Algerian 
who arrived in Australia in 1989; Aimen Joud (24), born in Australia; Fadl 
Sayadi (28), a Lebanese who arrived in Australia in 1983; Abdullah Merhi 
(23), born in Australia; Ahmed Raad (25) and Ezzit Raad (26), both born in 
Australia; Amer Haddara (29), born in Australia, Izzydeen Attik, age and na-
tionality unknown and Shane Kent (31) an Australian-born convert. The men 
had been training and conducting surveillance in 2004, but had allegedly not 
reached attack capability.67
A second group of men in Sydney were also planning a terrorist at-
tack at roughly the same time. It is unclear how the two groups initially 
made contact but there was limited correspondence between Benbrika and 
Mohamed Elomar (44), who arrived in Australia from Lebanon in 1977. 
Additional individuals arrested and charged included Khaled Cheikho (36) 
from Lebanon, who arrived in Australia in 1976, and his brother Moustafa 
Chiekho (32), born in Australia; Abdul Rakim Hasan (40), a Bangladeshi 
who arrived in Australia in 1989; and Mohammad Omar Jamal (21), born 
in Australia. Four other men—Omar Umar Sarif Baladjam, Mazen Touma, 
Khaled Sharrouf and Mirsda Mulahalilovic—pled guilty to lesser charges. 
This group was much more advanced and close to an attack against the Lucas 
Heights nuclear facility, having purchased weapons and chemicals.68 At trial, 
most of the Pendennis members spoke openly about attacking Australia in 
revenge for its support of U.S. Middle East policies.69
In 2007, the international media reported that five Australians had 
been detained in Lebanon and accused of funneling weapons and plotting 
terrorist attacks. Two men, Omar El Hadba (44) and Irahim Sabouh (33), 
both Lebanese-Australian citizens, were charged.70 A third man Bassem al-
Sayyed, a duel Lebanese-Australian citizen, was acquitted but died several 
months later in a gun battle with the Lebanese military.71 
In 2009, Operation Neath led to the arrest of five individuals planning 
an attack on the Holsworthy military base in Sydney. All five men were 
Australian citizens, of which three—Saney Edow Aweys (26) from Somalia, 
in Australia since 1998; Nayef El Sayed (25), born in Australia and Wissam 
Mahmoud Fattal (35), who arrived in Australia in 2003 from Lebanon—were 
charged.72 Yacqub Khayre and Abdirahman Ahmed were acquitted of all 
charges. The men became radicalized in Australia but officials report the 
men had attempted to make contact with members of al-Shabaab seeking a 
fatwa to sanction their attack.73 
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In addition to these cases, there are numerous examples of Australians 
traveling abroad to join foreign terrorist groups. Some of the more high 
profile incidents include the cases of Izhar Ul-Haque74 (21), and Ahmed Ali 
(25), killed fighting in Somalia in 2006.75 Somewithin the Australian-Somali 
community, however, suggest that this is underreported. Community lead-
ers estimate anywhere from ten to forty young Somali-Australians left to 
fight with al-Shabaab.� As of April 2013, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization believes that there may be up to 200 individuals with Australian 
passports fighting in Syria, some with Jabhat-al-Nusra, and that this figure 
has probably doubled since the early months of the war.�
Two Australian cases were omitted from this analysis. The first is the 
2002 Mantiqi 4 plot attributed to Jack Roche, an Australian citizen, as the 
plot was orchestrated and supported by Jemaah Islamiya.� The case of Zaky 
Mallah was also omitted. In 2003, he was charged with threatening to at-
tack the Australian Security Intelligence Organization or the Department of 
Foreign Affairs but his threats seem to have arisen out of Australia’s refusal 
to renew his passport so he could travel to Lebanon and was not necessarily 
global jihadist inspired.�
The Australian experiences do not appear to be out of line with the 
Canadian cases, albeit with subtle differences. First, three of the four planned 
attacks within Australia were orchestrated by large groups and were ambi-
tious and sophisticated with no indication of devolution. Second, a greater 
number of Australians travelled to join Islamic groups abroad. While al-
Shabaab remains part of the equation, it appears many Lebanese-Australians 
travel back to the Middle East and, more recently, Syria to fight. There also 
appear to be fewer cases where individuals in Australia provided material or 
logistical support to other individuals or groups. One possible explanation 
might be the geographical proximity to South East Asia and other Islamist 
groups, particularly Jemaah-Islamiya, which is known to be very organized in 
the region including operating in Australia itself.
United States
Information on American cases studies was gathered primarily from two 
compilations: Jerome Bjelopera’s January 2013 report from the Congressional 
Research Service80 and an April 2012 Backgrounder on disrupted terror 
plots since 9/11, by James Carafano, Steve Bucci and Jessica Zuckerman.81 
Bjelopera’s work is a chronological description of IIHGT incidents in the 
United States since 2001. His analysis distinguishes among the outcomes of 
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the action but does not attempt to compare and contrast it to other countries 
or examine it as a unique variant of Islamic terrorism.82 
He identifies and provides accounts of sixty-three incidents of home-
grown terrorist plots in the US between 9/11 and the publication of his re-
port, focusing on the outcome of the action. His analysis does not include the 
April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing where Tameran (26) and his brother 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev (19) detonated two pressure cooker bombs, killing three 
and injuring over 260 people.83 It includes those who planned a domestic 
attack within the U.S., those who travelled, or attempted to travel abroad to 
become foreign fighters, and those individuals who provided or planned to 
provide material support to terrorist groups abroad.84 His analysis revealed 
thirty-eight plots to attack internal U.S. targets, twenty plots to travel abroad 
and six incidents of individuals supporting terrorism.85 Further breaking 
down the plots to attack the U.S., twenty-five of the incidents were plotted by 
lone individuals, nine incidents were plotted by two, three or four individ-
uals, and four incidents involved larger groups.86
An overall assessment of these plots reveals several interesting results. 
First, of the twenty-two incidents plotting to attack the domestic U.S. recorded 
since 2009, eighteen were attempted by lone individuals and the additional 
four by pairs. While one or two individuals conducted attacks prior to this 
point, there are a steady number of larger groups perpetrating plots between 
2002 and 2009.87 Further, the number of individuals seeking to travel abroad 
to participate in foreign jihad also increased, with more than half occurring 
after 2010. The destination of choice for foreign fighters from the U.S. appears 
to be Somalia and al-Shabaab.
Attempts to measure the scale and sophistication of these plots is more 
difficult given the sample consists of only five successful incidents since 
9/11.88 In Bjelopera’s account, most of the thirty-eight plots targeting the do-
mestic United States are small in both scale and ambition relying on amateur 
knowledge and techniques. More ambitious and sophisticated plots would 
include: 
• Adel Daoud’s 2012 attempt to detonate a car bomb in down-
town Chicago; 
• Amine Khalifi’s 2012 plot to detonate a suicide vest at the US 
Capitol building; 
• Rezwan Ferdhaus’s 2011 efforts to fly remote controlled planes 
loaded with explosives at the U.S. Capitol; 




• Antonio Martinez’s 2010 efforts to detonate a car bomb in 
Maryland; 
• Mohamed Mohamud’s 2010 plot to detonate a car bomb at the 
Christmas tree lighting in Portland; 
• Farooque Ahmed’s 2010 plot to bomb DC subway system; 
• Faisal Shahzad car bomb in Times Square; 
• Hosam Smadi’s 2009 plot to bomb Dallas skyscraper; 
• Michael Finton’s 2009 plot to set off a car bomb at the Springfield 
Illinois Federal Building; 
• Najibullah Zazi’s 2009 plot to bomb the NY Subway; 
• The Boyd Group’s 2009 plot to attack Quantico; The Newburgh 
Four’s 2009 plot to target aircrafts and set off multiple car 
bombs in NY; 
• The 2007 Fort Dix plot; 
• The Liberty Seven’s 2006 plot to bomb the Sears Tower in 
Chicago; 
• Iyman Farris’s 2003 plot to topple the Brooklyn Bridge; and 
• Jose Padilla’s efforts to detonate a dirty bomb in Chicago in 
2002.89
Further trends observed from the United States stem from the obvious, 
including a greater number of overall incidents of all types, to the more 
subtle such, as the increase in the number of plots pursued by lone individ-
uals. Many recent incidents also appear to be ambitious and sophisticated. 
Coincidentally, this trend has increased at approximately the same time as 
the launch of Inspire, the online jihadi magazine launched in July 2010 by 
AQAP. The resource, now on its tenth edition is described by analysts as 
something which “should not be overblown but needs to be taken seriously,” 
and is much more advanced from earlier editions.90 Coinciding with the 
increase in the number of lone individuals and pairs is the absence of any 
larger groups over the past few years, something which occurred with some 
regularity between 2002 and 2008.
An Assessment of IIHGT: The Canadian, Australian and 
American Cases 
An analysis of the case studies demonstrates that various forms of IIHGT 
exist in all three states. Beyond that, however, few patterns cross these na-
tional boundaries, suggesting that there are no real observable trends or 
patterns. Additionally, it does not appear that the phenomenon is following 
a general trajectory. In addition to differing “endgames,” it is also clear that 
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those groups planning domestic attacks against their respective states vary 
in size, scale and sophistication. There is no evidence of an overlap in tech-
nique or strategies, with the exception of the 2003–2007 period, where each 
state examined experienced large groups planning large scale sophisticated 
attacks. The analysis reveals that U.S. plots are devolving in size and scope, 
Canada, at least currently, appears to be following a similar pattern, while 
Australia is an outlier, with few smaller efforts and most plots the work of 
larger groups.
Table 5
Comparison “Endgame” of IIHGT Incidents (Canada, Australia, and the 
United States)
Table 6
Comparison Size of Group Plotting Attack (Canada, Australia, and the 
United States)
Table 7
Comparison Scale and Sophistication of IIHGT Plots (Canada, Australia, 
and the United States)
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The recruitment of citizens or dual citizens appears to be increasing, es-
pecially in the last two years, while al-Shabaab appears to have been very active 
in all three states. However, one major difference between the U.S., Canada 
and Australia is that American officials have identified and neutralized many 
of those responsible for indoctrinating and radicalizing Americans. In the 
years right after 9/11, four radical imams lecturing in various cities around 
the U.S. were identified, including Ali-Al Timini in Virginia; Fawaz Damrah 
in Cleveland; Mohammed El-Mezain in Los Angeles; and Adnan Bayazid 
in Kansas City.91 Recently, other homegrown terrorist incidents have been 
tied to intermediaries directly in contact with individuals who became rad-
icalized. The Fort Hood shooter was connected to Anwar al-Awalaki, indi-
viduals from the Minnesota Somali community traveling to join al-Shabaab 
were recruited by Cabdulaahi Ahmed Farrax, and the Northern Virginia 
group was indoctrinated through a Taliban contact named “Saifullah,” who 
used personal email correspondence with each individual.92 Even the British 
government has identified sources of radicalization in the Finsbury Park and 
Brixton Mosques in London. Canada and Australia have been less successful 
in identifying networks and or recruiters in their countries. Those respon-
sible for radicalizing Medlej, Katsiroubas and Yoon and to a lesser degree 
the Ottawa 3, remain unknown. In Australia, while it is believed Benbrika 
radicalized the Melbourne Pendennis members. He was not responsible for 
radicalizing the Sydney group and those who plotted Operation Neath.
Incidents of providing material or logistical support also vary from state 
to state. As a proportion of the number of IIHGT incidents, Canada appears 
to have many more individuals who actively pursued this contribution/
avenue of action. This fact should not be a surprise. Canada has a history, 
deserving or not, as a haven for such activity for other groups. In the late 
1980s and 1990s, groups including the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and Hamas 
all operated within Canada.93
These findings parallel what we know about international Islamic terror-
ism more generally. As with international Islamic terrorism, there appears to 
be no standard trajectory or progression with IIHGT. Any numbers of forms 
exist and often overlap. The literature simultaneously categorizes al-Qaida as 
taking many different forms, each with different capabilities and character-
istics, including characterizations of “core,” “affiliates,” “local,” “network,” 
“associated movements, “brand,” independent operations,” and “middle 
managers.”94 Part of a larger debate among scholars is what to make of the 
multiple organizational mutations al-Qaida has undergone. Even those who 
argue that al-Qaida chooses to consciously evolve, acknowledge that this 
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process was easier to identify pre-9/11 as the organization grew and during 
the early days of the war on terror as it sought to survive.95 Different authors 
tend to put varying emphasis on the strength, capabilities and threat posed 
by these different forms of al-Qaida.96 Recent Embassy closings in the Middle 
East lend credence to the supposition that AQAP is the greatest threat.
One final piece of evidence about the progression of international 
Islamic terrorism comes from Osama bin Laden himself. Letters seized from 
bin Laden’s compound during the Abbotabad raids reveal mixed messages 
on this topic. At times, his letters appear to endorse empowering regional 
groups, but at other times he wants them to be controlled. The letters also 
portray bin Laden’s skepticism that these groups were the best way for-
ward for the global jihadist movement. He further chastised many of those 
inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology and, in reference to Faisal Shazad’s failed 
Times Square car bombing of, suggested their efforts make jihad “look bad.”� 
Far from a clear strategy moving forward, the letters seem to indicate that 
bin Laden and al-Qaida were not evolving purposefully but were victims of 
mutations outside their control. Depending on how one chooses to view the 
relationship between al-Qaida and these various incarnations a case can be 
made that international Islamic terrorism itself is now many different things 
as well.
Conclusion
Surveying the literature, there is no real definition of what constitutes IIHGT. 
Rather, a description of how it unfolds, based on where an individual was 
radicalized, seems to be the focal point. Therefore, IIHGT consists of domes-
tic attacks, providing material or logistical support, or traveling abroad to 
pursue jihad. Further, different characterizations of domestic attacks have 
been identified, depending on the number of individuals plotting, the scale 
or ambition of the plot and its sophistication. With so many potential vari-
ables it is no wonder there is a lack of agreement about what IIHGT is and 
how it should be understood. This also makes the identification of any trends 
or patterns almost impossible. 
In order to better understand IIHGT, I offer the following suggestions. 
First, examining IIHGT from the Canadian perspective revealed that while 
Canada’s experiences were generally fairly similar to those of other states, 
something else was occurring beneath the surface. The comparison seeming-
ly revealed greater divergence among the three states than commonalities. 
Thus, it is possible that IIHGT should not be viewed as one overarching phe-
nomenon, but rather as unique to the environment in which it occurs.� This 
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theory holds that, despite the international jihadist inspiration, domestic fac-
tors play a determining role in how IIHGT manifests itself in each state. For 
example, why are there a greater proportion of incidents in the United States 
which manifest as actual plots whereas, in both Canada and Australia, more 
individuals offer support and/or travel abroad? Why are Australians seem-
ingly more willing to travel abroad than Canadians or Americans? Future 
research is required to determine domestic, social or cultural conditions that 
might explain this divergence. For example, might a state’s integration or 
multiculturalism policy play a role? Is there a potential disconnect between 
the perception certain ethnic communities might have and the reality they 
experience? Is there anger towards the state’s foreign policy? How much 
might be a reflection of the individual and their sense of isolation, a lack of 
self worth or simply adventurism and excitement?
Second, to better understand and address IIHGT, we need to refine and 
break it down into disparate endgames. At the moment, IIHGT is a vacu-
ous term which risks becoming an empty concept. All three endgames 
must be investigated separately. Why does one individual choose to pursue 
to commit an actual attack, to join a group abroad, or simply raise money 
and spread propaganda? How do we account for the near enemy versus far 
enemy distinction�? Does attacking or plotting to attack one’s own society 
and fellow citizens require a greater degree of radicalization than providing 
passive support or going abroad to fight?
IIHGT remains a very real and potent threat to most Western democratic 
states. Further analysis is required as intelligence agencies and academics 
play catch-up in an effort to understand and combat this phenomenon. A 
more nuanced approach is required taking into account that IIHGT is not one 





Tables 8–11 show a breakdown of the Australian cases based on citizenship, 
endgame, size of the groups and scale and sophistication.
Table 8
Nationality of Individuals Involved in IIHGT (Australia)
Table 9
“Endgame” of IIHGT Incidents (Australia)
Table 10




Scale and Sophistication of IIHGT Plots (Australia)
Tables 12–14 show a breakdown of the United States cases based on endgame, 
size of the groups and scale and sophistication.
Table 12




Size of Group Plotting Attack (United States)
Table 14
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